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Abstract
In this paper, we quantify the effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
from a macroeconomic perspective. We use an incomplete markets model to ana-
lyze jointly the labor supply and saving responses to changes in tax credit generosity
and their aggregate and distributional implications. In line with existing literature,
our results show that the EITC is an effective policy instrument to raise labor force
participation and provide insurance to working poor households. However, we show
that the EITC also disincentivizes private savings for a large part of the population,
except for the poorest transfer recipients. Furthermore, since unskilled labor supply
reacts more strongly than skilled workers’ labor supply, wages for low skilled workers
fall relative to high skilled workers. Whilst reducing post-tax earnings inequality, the
EITC contributes to both a higher skill premium and wealth inequality. Finally, our
welfare analysis suggests that EITC expansions are welfare improving for the majority
of the population, both ex ante and when accounting for transitional dynamics.
1 Introduction
Welfare programs subsidizing low income households are a defining feature of welfare
states in advanced economies. While income support programs provide partial insurance
against permanent and transitory income risks, they have adverse effects on individuals’
incentives to work and save. To address this incentive problem, welfare states condition the
eligibility to income support programs on the households’ labor market participation, and
provide tax credits to working households. For instance, in the United States the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) targets low income working individuals and tops up their labor
earnings. The amount depends on individual taxable gross income and can be higher than
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their gross tax liability: the tax credit is refundable. The program thus encourages work
and provides insurance against labor market risks by increasing tax progressivity for low
income households.
The motivation for our analysis is threefold. First the EITC is the largest and fastest
growing anti-poverty program in the United States 1 and currently reaches more than a
fifth of households.2 The EITC is widely credited to improve the well-being of households
with low earnings, and to having lifted 9.1 million people out of poverty (Nichols and
Rothstein 2015). Second the EITC’s share of the US federal budget, as of 2012, comes close
to the share allocated to unemployment insurance (see figure 10a). While the effects of
unemployment insurance policies have been discussed at length in the literature, evidence
on the EITC’s distributional and aggregate effects is scarce given its policy relevance.
Third, the existing literature on the EITC is largely silent about the EITC’s insurance
effect, its effects on savings, wealth inequality, and welfare. While such effects are widely
discussed in the literature on optimal taxation and unemployment insurance, little is
known about these aspects of tax credit policies. Since the aim of the EITC is to encourage
labor force participation, the main focus of the literature has been on the labor supply
effects of the EITC. Yet, the program size and the strength of the estimated labor supply
effects suggest important price effects and call for a macroeconomic analysis of the EITC,
which we are the first to provide.
The purpose of this paper is to quantify these effects. We evaluate how the EITC affects
households’ incentive to save and supply labor and provides insurance against labour
market risks. Also, we analyze how tax credit generosity affects welfare both from an ex-
ante and ex-post perspective. We proceed in three steps. First, we build a dynamic general
equilibrium model of consumption, labor supply and savings decisions with permanent
skill differences where individuals face risk to their labor productivity (Aiyagari 1994,
Huggett 1993). We augment this model with non-linear taxes (net of EITC) on individual
gross income and the EITC schedule. Second, we calibrate parameters of the model to
replicate features of the US economy. Third, we conduct policy counterfactuals to analyze
the effects of the EITC on individual behavior, distributions, aggregates and welfare. Our
policy experiment consists in raising tax credit generosity. It mimics a source of exogenous
variation, state-level EITC supplements to the federal rate, that is used in the empirical
literature to identify behavioral responses to the EITC, thereby allowing us to contrast
our results with existing empirical evidence.
Our results show that the EITC is a well targeted program: it improves households’
insurance and welfare without reducing households’ incentive to work. However, it reduces
their incentives to save and leads to higher indebtedness among EITC recipients. We find
1The EITC was started in 1975. As of 2012, refundable tax credits amount to 6% of the federal benefits
to persons in the US, which comes close to the federal budget for unemployment insurance (see appendix).
2In 2015, about 27 million tax filers received EITC (https://www.eitc.irs.gov/EITC-Central/eitcstats).
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that the labor supply margin is the most important one for the poorest households, but
the intertemporal margin is more relevant for households on the phase-out range of the tax
credit schedule. The predictions from our model are consistent with previous empirical
findings and confirm that the policy contributes to an increase in the skill premium through
a crowding in effect of low skilled labor supply. Furthermore, from an ex-ante perspective,
an increase in EITC generosity in the currently implemented form of state supplements is
a welfare enhancing policy for the majority of the population. It benefits poor households
through a smoother consumption profile, but also richer households through a general
equilibrium effect on their earnings.
The literature on the effects of the EITC is dense. Most papers, however, focus ex-
clusively on labor supply responses to increases in EITC generosity in partial equilibrium
environments with given wages.3 A key normative theoretical contribution is Saez (2002).
He solves for the optimal income tax schedule in a standard static labor supply model and
shows that the optimal transfer to poor households resembles the EITC if labor supply re-
sponses to cash transfers take place on the extensive margin. However, if the elasticities of
labor supply are such that cash transfers lead to increases in labor supply on the intensive
margin, then a negative income tax is optimal. The literature estimates these labor supply
responses to increases in EITC generosity. This literature shows that households and indi-
viduals in the United States adjust their labor supply largely on the extensive margin and
to a lesser extent via hours of work (Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001, Rothstein 2010, Eissa,
Kleven and Kreiner 2008, Eissa and Liebman 1996).4 Part of this lack of intensive mar-
gin response among poor households can be accounted for by lack of information about
the tax and transfer schedule (Chetty, Friedman and Saez 2013). There is a consensus
in the literature that labor force participation is more elastic than hours worked to tax
credit reforms in the United States (Blundell and Hoynes 2004): if there is a labor supply
response, it works at large via the extensive margin (Meyer 2002, Meyer 2010, Eissa and
Hoynes 2006, Hotz and Scholz 2003). Motivated by this unanimous empirical evidence
for the United States our model features only the extensive margin of households’ labor
supply.
The identification of these statistically significant and large changes in labor participa-
tion raises the question whether and how equilibrium wages adjust in response to changes
in EITC generosity. Leigh (2010) and Rothstein (2010) address this question empirically
3An comprehensive review of the literature on the EITC is provided by Nichols and Rothstein (2015).
4Eissa et al. (2008) document this fact for a sample of single mothers. They emphasize that the relative
importance of the extensive and the intensive margin has first order welfare effects. Eissa and Liebman
(1996) analyze the labor supply response of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 which encompassed an expansion
of the EITC. Their identification strategy relies on comparing outcomes of single women without children
with single women with children (who receive higher tax credits) and shows that labor force participation
increases relatively more for single women with children, the strength of the response being negatively
correlated with education. Importantly they do not find evidence that the EITC expansion decreases
hours worked for people already in the labor force.
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and show that wage effects are relatively large and statistically significant, in particular
for unskilled labor. Rothstein (2010), for example, shows that single mothers and childless
women lose 55% of the marginal EITC dollar due to reduced wages. Leigh (2010) esti-
mates that an increase of 10% in EITC generosity leads to a 5% drop of wages for high
school dropouts, a 2% fall in wages those with high school diploma and has no effects on
the wages of individuals with tertiary education. This evidence motivates our choice to
analyze the distributive effects of the EITC though the lens of a general equilibrium model
with permanent skill heterogeneity and endogenous wage distribution.
Beyond its intra-temporal effect on labor market participation and wages, tax credit
policies should affect households’ saving behavior for two reasons. First by changing the
effective marginal tax rates schedule, the EITC alters household disposable income and
should lead to changes in both labor supply and savings. Second, welfare programs in
general affect the risk sharing properties of the economy and thereby households’ precau-
tionary savings motive (Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes 1995, Feldstein 1995). For example,
Engen and Gruber (2001) show the importance of savings response to changes in un-
employment insurance policies. Given this evidence, it seems pertinent to jointly allow
tax credit reforms to affect savings behavior and labor supply. Recently, Blundell, Dias,
Meghir and Shaw (2015) account for the role of the intertemporal margin in a structural
model of human capital accumulation and female labor supply and the role of the United
Kingdom tax credit program. They emphasize both the insurance value of the tax credit
for poor working women, as well as the negative effect on self-insurance. For the United
States and the EITC, Weber (2014) finds that around 40 percent of the decline in the
fraction of EITC recipients with savings in income bearing accounts can be explained by
changes in EITC incentives, suggesting adverse effect on the individuals’ incentive to save.
The aforementioned empirical evidence and existing research suggests that an assess-
ment of tax credit reforms should jointly allow for changes in the labor force composition,
savings behavior and wage adjusments. We therefore develop a model that features the
main behavioral and general equilibrium responses of the EITC identified in the empirical
literature, based on which we conduct a welfare analysis of tax credit policies.
This paper is also related to the literature on the evaluation of policy reforms in
inter-temporal choice models with heterogeneity.5 The literature on the tax reforms
(Domeij and Heathcote 2004, Heathcote 2005), insurance effects of tax progressivity re-
forms (Conesa and Krueger 2006, Conesa, Kitao and Krueger 2009, Heathcote, Storeslet-
ten and Violante 2014, Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura 2012) and unemployment insurance
(Engen and Gruber 2001, Crossley and Low 2011) is dense, but few papers look at transfer
policy reforms (Athreya, Reilly and Simpson 2014, Oh and Reis 2012). Oh and Reis (2012)
model targeted transfers that are conditioned on household health and on their produc-
tivity. In their framework, targeted transfers are expansionary because they redistribute
5An extensive review of this literature is provided in Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2009).
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funds from healthy, high productivity workers towards low productivity workers. This re-
distribution has an expansionary effect since to finance those transfers, high productivity
workers face a negative wealth effect which induces them to work more, while sick workers
will reduce their labor supply. In contrast, our transfer is conditioned on persistent shocks
to household productivity, giving an stronger role to private savings and hence crowding
out effects. Athreya et al. (2014) highlight the insurance effect of the EITC for young
unskilled women in a partial equilibrium environment. In particular, they show that the
EITC reduces consumption volatility over the life cycle by 12 percentage points relative
to an economy without transfer program. In contrast to Athreya et al. (2014) equilibrium
wages are in our framework not policy invariant.
We contribute to both literatures. Beyond validating the effect of increased generosity
on labor force participation and equilibrium wages highlighted by the empirical literature
on the EITC, we analyze the EITC’s effects on households’ savings behavior. Overall
the design of the EITC is well suited to circumvent the adverse effects of income support
programs on the incentives to work, however it adversely affects the incentives to save
and fosters wealth inequalities. Also our modelling exercise allows us to make welfare
statements about the EITC and to contribute to the literature on fiscal policy. For a
given income tax code that is calibrated to the US, we show that the EITC improves
welfare by introducing more tax progressivity at the bottom of the income distribution.
Conesa and Krueger (2006) show that tax deductions are a characteristic of an optimal
progressive labor income tax. Our results suggest that tax credit policies such as the EITC
step in for this missing progressivity of the tax code, and are one of the underlying policy
instrument of the tax deductions advocated in Conesa and Krueger (2006).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: In section 2, we present our
theoretical model and then proceed to our calibration strategy in section 3. We present
the results from an extension of the tax credit in section 4, and conclude in section 5.
2 The Model
The economy is populated by four types of agents: a continuum of households, a gov-
ernment, a representative firm and an external sector. Households supply labor to firms,
consume a homogeneous good, and hold real risk-free assets. They differ in terms of skills
and are subject to idiosyncratic shocks on their labor productivity. They self-insure by
both borrowing or saving and working. Firms use the labor and capital supplied by house-
holds and the rest of the world, to produce the final good. They produce using a constant
returns to scale technology and there is free entry in the goods market. The government
pays out tax credit to working households that qualify, welfare to non-working households
and taxes households’ gross income non-linearly.
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2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived households that differ per-
manently in their skill level (i = {u, s}): a mass of households πu is low-skilled and the
complementary mass of households πs is high-skilled. Within each group, households draw
labor productivity shocks (ǫ) from an AR(1) process characterized by its persistence ρi
and its variance σ2i . Beyond the permanent inequality, within each group, households are
heterogeneous since their asset holdings reflect their individual history of labor produc-
tivity shocks. Households can partly self-insure against idiosyncratic productivity shocks
by borrowing and saving in a non state-contingent asset (at) and by supplying labor. The
labor supply decision is binary: households either work full time (1t = {1, 0}), in which
case they supply labor inelastically and obtain earnings according to the efficiency wage
(Wi,t ≡ wi,tǫ) or they do not participate and obtain welfare transfer payments (ω). Savings
and borrowing is subject to an interest rate rt. Households can borrow up to an exogenous
borrowing limit (a). Households’ net tax payments depends on their labor income and
gross capital income (Dt ≡ rtat) and is determined by the function T (Wt,Dt), which is
the aggregate of a non-linear tax function on gross income and refundable tax credits, as
detailed further in subsection 2.3.
Households derive utility from consumption (ct) and incur a group-specific utility cost
qi when working. We assume that instantaneous utility is of the CRRA type and also
allow the subjective discount factor βi to be skill group specific. Households maximize
expected life time utility subject to the infinite sequence of budget constraints (2 and 4).
E
∞∑
t=0
βti (u(ct)− qi1t) (1)
where E is the mathematical expectations operator. If the household chooses to supply
labor 1t = 1, its budget constraint reads:
ct + at+1 = wi,tǫt + (1 + rt)at − T (Wt,Dt) (2)
at+1 ≥ a (3)
However, if the household decides to remain outside the labor force (1t = 0), he receives
welfare (ω) and its budget constraint is as follows:
ct + at+1 = ω + (1 + rt)at (4)
at+1 ≥ a. (5)
In each period, households choose their consumption (ct), whether to enter in the labor
force (1t) and asset holdings for the next period (at+1) such that their budget constraint
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is satisfied.6
2.2 Firms
Firms operate a constant return to scale production technology and are perfectly com-
petitive. They demand capital K and labor L to produce the final good, Y . Capital
depreciates at the rate δ and its return (R) is defined net of depreciation, R = r−δ, where
R is the marginal product of capital.
Y = KαL1−α (6)
We assume that firms use both high and low skilled labor. The labor types are imper-
fectly substitutable (Murphy and Katz 1992). Aggregate labour input is thus defined as
a composite of low skilled and high skilled labor.7
L ≡ [λLρs + (1− λ)L
ρ
u]
1/ρ , ρ ≤ 1
where ǫ = 11−ρ is the elasticity of substitution between skilled labor Ls and unskilled labor
Lu and λ is a ‘demand shifter‘. Profit maximizing firms set wages to the marginal product
of labor for both types, which gives rise to an endogenous skill premium.
ws = (1− α)kαλ
(
L
Ls
)1−ρ
, wu = (1− α)kα(1− λ)
(
L
Lu
)1−ρ
The ratio of wages across skill groups determines the skill premium and its relationship
with the ratio of skilled to unskilled labour Ls/Lu.
ws
wu
=
λ
1− λ
(
Ls
Lu
)ρ−1
,
∂ wswu
∂ LsLu
= (ρ− 1)
λ
1− λ
(
Ls
Lu
)ρ−2
The skill premium is unambiguously decreasing in the ratio of skilled to unskilled
labour supply. The decrease is an increasing function of complementarity: the more
complementary the two labor inputs are, the more will wages change as a result to a
change in labor supply or labor demand.
6We focus on stationary equilibria, that is rt = r and drop time indices from now on.
7This production function is common in the literature on the macroeconomic implications of income
inequality, but also structural change. Recent papers include Krueger and Ludwig (2015), Heathcote,
Storesletten and Violante (2010b), and Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull and Violante (2000). The latter are
particularly interested in explaining the rise in the skill premium during the past decades, while Krueger
and Ludwig (2015) analyze optimal tax progressivity.
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2.3 Government
The government taxes Adjusted Gross Income (AGI), distributes tax credits to working
households and welfare to non-working households. The overall net-tax payment function
(T (W,D)) summarizes the income tax and the tax credit, where W denotes labor income,
D dividends, and AGI is the sum of both sources of income.
T (W,D) = τ(AGI)AGI −Υ(W,D),
where W ≡ wǫ, D ≡ ra, AGI = wǫ+ ra
The ingredients of the net tax function are a non-linear taxation function τ(AGI), and
the Earned Income Tax Credit schedule Υ(W,D). The tax function τ(AGI) is a smooth
approximation of the income tax schedule net of any welfare programs such as the EITC.
The average tax rate is shown in equation (7), and the marginal tax rate in equation (8).
τ(AGI) = b(1− (sAGIp + 1)
−1
p ) (7)
τ˜(AGI) = b(1− (sAGIp + 1)
−1
p
−1) (8)
The tax credit schedule Υ(W,D) is parametrized based on data from the 2010 EITC
schedule as reported by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). In figure 1, we show (a)
the EITC schedule as a function of income, (b) the effect of the EITC on the effective
average tax rate, and (c) the transfer to income ratio of the EITC, for the relevant range
of income levels. The tax credit schedule (Υ(W,D)) is defined by six parameters. The
parameters αin and βin are the intercept and the slope of the phase-in region of the tax
credit function. In the phase-in region of the tax credit function is an increasing function
of AGI. It ends for income levels above T . For income levels AGI ∈
[
T , T
]
households
perceive the maximum level of Tax Credit which is denoted Υ¯; this corresponds to the
so-called plateau region of the EITC. For the income levels AGI ∈
[
T , T̂
]
, the Tax Credit
pay-off is decreasing and determined by αout and βout, the intercept and the slope of the
linear function that describes the so-called phase-out region of the EITC. Note that both
the income level at which the phase-out starts T¯ and ends T̂ are a function of the EITC
policy parameters.
Υ(W,D) =

αin + βinAGI if T > AGI > 0
Υ¯ if T ≥ AGI ≥ T
αout + βoutAGI if T̂ > AGI > T
0 if AGI ≥ T̂
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where T = Υ¯−αinβin , T =
Υ¯−αout
βout
, T̂ = −αoutβout . Also the EITC pay-off is asset-tested: if a
households whose AGI is within the bounds for EITC eligibility, but has a capital income
that is above a threshold level of D¯, then that household looses its EITC eligibility.
Υ(W,D) = 0 , if ra > D.
Multiples of Average AGI
0 0.5 1
Ef
fe
ct
ive
 A
ve
ra
ge
 T
ax
 R
at
e
-0.35
-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
w/ EITC
w/o EITC
Multiples of Average AGI
0 0.5 1
N
om
in
al
 T
ax
 C
re
di
t
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
Multiples of Average AGI
0 0.5 1
Tr
an
sf
er
 to
 A
G
I r
at
io
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Figure 1: EITC and its effect on the average tax rate.
Government spending G is the sum of net tax payments, welfare expenditure and
transfer payments:
G =
∫
IxAxE
1(i, a, ǫ)T (W,D)dλ(i, a, ǫ) −
∫
IxAxE
(1− 1(i, a, ǫ))ωdλ(i, a, ǫ) (9)
where ω denotes welfare transfer payments and IxAxE with I : i ∈ {s, u}, a ∈ [a¯,∞), ǫ ∈ E
is the cartesian product of the possibility sets of skill levels, assets, and productivity levels
for all households in the economy:
2.4 Small open economy
We assume that the economy is small and that capital is perfectly mobile. The domestic
real interest rate is constant and equals to the world interest rate r. Hence, the marginal
productivity of capital is equal to the world real interest rate net of depreciation:
r − δ = αkα−1 = α
Y
K
,
where Y is aggregate output and K is total capital used in production. This implies that
the capital output ratio is determined by the real interest rate r, the depreciation rate
9
δ and the capital share α. Given the definition of the production function, the capital
labour ratio (k) is also constant and given by:
k =
K
L
=
(
r + δ
α
) 1
α−1
.
Since we assume free capital mobility, K = k L is positively and linearly related to
aggregate labor supply. The real interest rate r cannot adjust to equate demand for
capital and aggregate domestic savings Kdom. Firms will demand capital from the rest
of the world, if aggregate savings fall short of demand; if savings exceed capital demand,
households will save abroad. Hence, domestic savings are a fraction of the total capital
stock used in production Kdom = (1− ϑ)K.8
The aggregate resource constraint of this economy is given by the following equation:
C + I +G+NX = Y (10)
After aggregating the budget constraint of the continuum of households, and using the
fact that net exports (or the current account) amount to the difference between current
capital inflows (1 − ϑ)K (as this is an export) and repayments (1 − ϑ)(1 + r)K (plus
interest, at the given world interest rate), the following equation must hold in equilibrium.
(1− ϑ)(K − (1 + r)K) = −(1− ϑ)(αY − δK)
2.5 Recursive Formulation of the household problem
The household maximization problem can be written recursively as a function of his state
variables (i, a, ǫ). V (i, a, ǫ) denotes the discounted expected life-time utility of a household
with asset holdings a, labor productivity ǫ and skill type i. Since the decision to work is a
discrete choice, the value function V (i, a, ǫ) is obtained by taking the maximand between
the indirect utility from working and the indirect utility from not working.
V (i, a, ǫ) = max
1=[0,1]
[V (i, 1, a, ǫ);V (i, 0, a, ǫ)]
1(i, a, ǫ) is the policy function for household’s decision whether or not to participate
in the labor market.
1(i, a, ǫ) =
0 if V (i, 0, a, ǫ) > V (i, 1, a, ǫ)1 else.
8Strictly speaking, it is indeterminate whether firms will use foreign or domestic capital in production
because capital is perfectly substitutable irrespective of its origin. Only net figures, i.e. the capital account
balance, are determined. For simplicity, we assume that firms first use domestic, then foreign capital.
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The indirect utility a household that supplies labor is computed as follows.
V (i, 1, a, ǫ) = max
a′,c
u(c) − qi + βi
∫
ǫ′∈Ω
V (i, a′, ǫ′)f(ǫ, ǫ′)dǫ′
s.t. c+ a′ = wiǫ+ (1 + r)a− T (W,D)
a′ ≥ a
The dynamic program of a labor market non-participant is as follows.
V (i, 0, a, ǫ) = max
a′,c
u(c) + βi
∫
ǫ′∈Ω
V (i, a′, ǫ′)f(ǫ, ǫ′)dǫ′
s.t. c+ a′ = ω + (1 + r)a
a′ ≥ a
As highlighted in section 2.3, the amount of transfers distributed by the government
depend on the households’ choice variables 1 and a. The household internalizes the transfer
rule in her decision-making, which is reflected in the following intertemporal optimality
condition of the household problem.
u′(c) = βi(1 + r − ∂T (W,D)/∂D)Eu
′(c′) + µ, µ ≥ 0.
where µ denote the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint. The households’ in-
tertemporal optimal condition dictates that whenever the borrowing constraint is binding,
ceteris paribus current marginal utility from consumption is higher and consumption is
lower than when the constraint does not bind. As the tax credit is contingent on house-
holds’ capital income, it directly impacts the return on capital which becomes household
specific. If TD < 0, that is, if the tax credit benefits low asset holders, the household
faces a tax on asset holdings and internalizes this into the optimal investment choice. A
steep transfer function ceteris paribus translates into lower savings and higher current
consumption. On the other hand, in the presence of such a tax credit, a credit constrained
household benefits from receiving a higher transfer, which reduces his consumption volatil-
ity.9
Stationary Competitive Equilibrium Given a borrowing limit a, an exogenous inter-
est rate r, an income tax schedule τ(W + D) and a transfer allocation rule Υ(W,D), a
stationary competitive equilibrium is a set of positive wages wi by skill type, a positive
quantity of aggregate labour supply L and capital supply K, time invariant decision rules
9The first order condition is outlined here to develop intuition. Given the non-linearities of the EITC
schedule, our numerical algorithm uses the value function iteration method and not the first order condition
method as the above equation may suggest.
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a′(i, a, ǫ),1(i, a, ǫ) and a probability distribution λ(i, a, ǫ) such that:
1. Equilibrium wages wi satisfy the static optimization problem of the representative
firm formulated in section 2.2
2. The policy functions c(i, a, ǫ), a′(i, a, ǫ),1(i, a, ǫ) solve the household maximization
problem formulated in section 2.5
3. The probability distributions λ(i, a, ǫ) are stationary distributions s.t.
λ(i, a′, ǫ′) =
∫
ǫ
∫
a:a′(i,a,ǫ)
λ(i, a, ǫ˜)df(ǫ˜′|ǫ˜)
4. The labor market clears, such that aggregate effective labor equals the sum of all
individual hours supplied multiplied by their respective productivity:
L =
∫ a¯
a
∫
ǫ
∫
i=u,e
1(i, a˜, ǫ˜)n(i, a˜, ǫ˜)ǫλ(i, a, ǫ˜)da˜dǫ˜di.
5. The government taxes labor and redistributes via tax credits and welfare. Govern-
ment spending (G) amounts to the gap between tax revenues and transfers, as in
equation (9).
6. The good market clears, such that aggregate output is the sum of consumption,
investment, government spending, investment and net exports.
NX = −(1− ϑ) (αY − δK)
where ϑ is the fraction of the total capital stock that is domestic.
7. By Walras Law, the capital market clears.
3 Parametrization
In this section we lay down our calibration strategy. We first document the parameters
that are fixed outside the model and subsequently explain the data targets sought for the
remaining parameters. Finally we show how the model performs for moments that are not
targeted.
3.1 Idiosyncratic Productivity Shocks
In the model, we assume that households differ permanently in their skill level. They can
either be ’high skilled’ or ’low skilled’. Following previous literature, we assume that ’high
12
skilled’ households are those with education beyond a high school degree. Consequently,
’low skilled’ households have education lower than or equal to a high school degree. The
parameters of the AR(1) process for the idiosyncratic labor productivity for both sub-
groups are taken from Krueger and Ludwig (2015).10 We then parametrize the process
for ǫ by discretizing the AR(1) process for both groups into a ten state Markov Chain
following Tauchen (1986).
Value Source
ρs 0.969 Krueger & Ludwig (2015)
ρu 0.928 Krueger & Ludwig (2015)
σs 0.100 Krueger & Ludwig (2015)
σu 0.141 Krueger & Ludwig (2015)
pis 0.450 CPS 2010
piu 0.550 CPS 2010
Table 1: Heterogeneity parameters
3.2 Tax function and EITC schedule
The parameters of the income tax function are taken from Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura
(2013). Based on recent micro data from the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, they provide
parametric estimates of effective tax functions. For the purpose of our paper, it is essential
to obtain a tax function net of EITC, so that we can model explicitly the EITC schedule,
and thereby isolate the effect of changes in the EITC program. Guner et al. (2013) test
several approximations that are used in the literature on recent U.S. household data from
the Internal Revenue Services ’Public Use Tax File’. Guner et al. (2013) emphasize that
the Gouveia and Strauss (1994) approximation matches best the average tax schedule of
the US, in particular for households with annual incomes ranging from the mean of US
household income up to 3 means of household income. However, the Gouveia and Strauss
(1994) approximation fails to compute negative tax schedules and matches poorly the
tax incidence for households at the bottom of the earnings distribution. Our approach
combines the Gouveia and Strauss (1994) approximation with an explicit modelling of
the EITC, and thereby allows us to deliver a good fit of the effect of tax incidence and
progressivity both at the bottom and in the middle of the income distribution. The
Gouveia and Strauss (1994) tax function is described in section 2 and restated below
(equations 11 - 12).
τ(AGI) = b(1− (sAGIp + 1)
−1
p ) (11)
τ˜(AGI) = b(1− (sAGIp + 1)
−1
p
−1) (12)
10Table 3 in Krueger and Ludwig (2015).
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Table 2 reports their parameter estimates of the ’GS’ (Gouveia-Strauss) approximation
to the tax function for married households.11 We focus on married households, since they
represent 62.3% of U.S. individuals (CPS, 2010).12 Also we can confidently assume that
they all file jointly: 94.77% of married household file taxes jointly (CPS, 2010) allowing
us to select the EITC schedule for joint tax filers. Although we model only one type
of household, our tax system is representative at the aggregate level since we capture
accurately the tax system for over 60 percent of the population.
Value Source
αin 0 IRS 2010
βin 0.34 IRS 2010
T 3162 IRS 2010
αout 6727.91 IRS 2010
βout -0.16 IRS 2010
D¯ 3100 IRS 2010
b 0.247 Guvenen et al. (2013)
s 0.001 Guvenen et al. (2013)
p 1.850 Guvenen et al. (2013)
Table 2: Taxation Parameters
The amount of tax credit a tax filer is eligible to claim depends on his gross earned
income, individual filing status, on the number of dependent children as well as on in-
dividuals’ capital income, which must not exceed a threshold (USD 3’100 in 2010). The
six parameters that determine the EITC schedule and the capital income limit (D¯) are
taken from the tax code (IRS) and reported in table 2. They describe the EITC schedule
for married households that file taxes jointly, as argued above, and have one qualifying
child in 2012. We choose to focus on the EITC schedule with one qualifying child, since
it corresponds to the median number of children under 18 in married households that file
taxes jointly (CPS 2010 - average is at 1.27). We focus on this category of household
with the aim to match an ’average’ EITC recipient. Overall, the tax credit schedule is
characterized by three regions: the phase-in, the plateau and the phase-out range. In
the phase-in range, the transfer increases with earned income, in the plateau region it is
constant, and it falls in the phase-out range as shown in figure 11.
3.3 Calibration
In this subsection we document how we calibrated the remaining parameters. The type
dependent utility cost of participating in the labor market (qi) is set to match the fraction
of high and low skilled households working full time during the past year. The subjective
discount factors (βi) target the relative wealth across skill types that is observed in the
11Table 10 in Guner et al. (2013).
12Interestingly from the remaining 37.7% of U.S. individuals 81.3% (or 30.55% of the U.S. individuals)
are unmarried or non-family female households. So far the EITC literature has almost exclusively focused
on this household type.
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United States, as reported in Slav´ık and Yazici (2014), and the fraction of indebted house-
holds which is based on SCF (2010) data. To compute the fraction of indebted households,
we proceed as in A´braha´m and Ca´rceles-Poveda (2010) and exclude non-financial assets
and secured debt from our measure of wealth since our model is tailored towards liquid
financial assets. Based on this empirical measure of wealth we compute the fraction of
households with negative wealth. The labor demand shifter (λ) in the production func-
tion is used to generate a wage skill premium of 1.80, as documented in Heathcote, Perri
and Violante (2010a). The parameter determining welfare payments (ω) is chosen such
that they amount to 20% of mean household income as reported in Holter, Krueger and
Stepanchuk (2014). The elasticity of substitution across labor skill types is taken from
Murphy and Katz (1992). The depreciation rate δ is chosen to amount to 0.08, so that
the capital to output ratio amounts to 3. And the capital share (α) is set to 0.33, since
US data suggests a labor share of 0.66.
Value Target Value Source
qs 0.558 Labor Force Participation 0.85 CPS 2010
qu 1.028 Labor Force Participation 0.70 CPS 2010
βs 0.970 Relative Wealth 2.68 Slavik & Yacizi (2014)
βu 0.965 Fraction of indebted HH 0.29 SCF 2010
λ 0.633 Skill Premium 1.80 Heathcote et al. (2010)
ω 0.116 Welfare % of mean income 0.20 Holter et al. (2015)
δ 0.080 Capital-Output Ratio 3.00
α 0.330 Labor Share 0.66
ρ 0.310 Elas. of substitution 1.45 Katz & Murphy (1992)
γ 1.500 Risk Aversion fixed
r 0.030 Interest Rate fixed
Table 3: Calibration - Model with extensive margin
The two remaining parameters, the real interest rate and the risk aversion parameter
(r, γ), are set exogenously. We set an annual interest rate of 3%, and choose a coefficient
of relative risk aversion of 1.5.13
3.4 Model performance
In this subsection, we briefly discuss the performance of our model in replicating empirical
moments that are not targeted by our calibration strategy. These moments can be read
in Table 4.
We first document the fraction of population that receives tax credits.14 Our model
largely overstates the take-up of EITC. This discrepancy with the data can be partly
13Results for the model with a high degree of risk aversion are available upon request.
14The following comparisons should not be taken at face value, since the EITC data moments refer to the
whole population whereas our model focuses on the EITC schedule and tax schedule of married households
only. A legitimate comparison would require access to public tax data.
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Model Data Source
EITC Take-up (% pop.) 31.49 16.20 Rothstein (2015)
Ls 20.26 -
Lu 40.68 -
Phase-in 0.00 4.30
Plateau 3.53 2.70
Phase-out 27.95 9.20
EITC to GDP ratio Υ
Y
0.84 1.00
Post-Tax Earnings (%) Q1 4.46 7.90 Pijoan-Mas (2006)
Q2 12.34 13.70
Q3 17.24 18.00
Q4 23.73 23.30
Q5 42.23 37.10
Wealth (%) Q1 -2.18 -0.30 Pijoan-Mas (2006)
Q2 0.39 1.30
Q3 6.30 5.00
Q4 19.81 12.20
Q5 75.68 81.70
Table 4: Untargeted moments.
explained by incomplete take-up due to incomplete information about the program, a
phenomenon termed as low program awareness (Bhargava and Manoli 2015). This type of
informational friction could potentially account for about 25% of the number of missing
claims by potentially eligible persons, as has been assessed for the tax years 1990 and 2005
by Scholz (1993) and Plueger (2009), respectively.
In terms of matching the fraction of individuals in the different regions of the EITC
schedule, we fail to account for the fraction of agents in the phase-in region of the EITC
schedule, but perform well in replicating a fraction of household of around 3% in the
plateau region of the schedule. This match could be improved by taking household compo-
sition into account, in particular poor single mothers. Since the subsidy effect of increased
generosity is largest on the phase-in region of the program, the quantitative effects on
individuals that we document in section 4 can therefore be perceived as lower bounds.
However, the distributional and aggregate effects are unlikely to change, as these individ-
uals will most likely be poor, low skilled, and have a relatively high fix cost of working.
In fact, in the data most of the EITC recipients are located in the phase-out region of the
schedule (Nichols and Rothstein 2015).
In terms of matching the empirical earnings and wealth distribution, our model per-
forms well in matching the distribution of earnings and wealth in the lower three quantiles,
which is essential for our policy experiments. However, our model does not account for the
high concentration of income and wealth in the fifth quantile which is a common weakness
of the standard incomplete markets model as discussed in Heathcote et al. (2009).
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4 Results from an expansion of the EITC
We quantify the effects of tax credit policies such as the EITC by conducting the follow-
ing policy experiment: for a constant gross income range of tax credit eligibility that is
calibrated to the data, we increase the amount of tax credit paid out, i.e. we vary the
generosity of the tax credit program. We model this increase in generosity by multiplying
the calibrated EITC schedule Υ(W,D) by a factor (1+η). This modeling choice is guided
by an institutional setup that prevails in the United States: it mimics the state tax credit
supplement programs that exist in most US states. While keeping the range of eligibility
for earned income and the asset test at the federal level, state tax credit supplements top
up the federal tax credit by a percentage η that varies across states.15 Doing so allows
us to compare our results with the empirical evidence provided by Leigh (2010), since our
policy experiment replicates the source of exogenous variation that he uses to empirically
identify labor supply and wage effects of increased tax credit generosity.16
By supplementing the tax credit paid out, the policy experiment effectively changes
the progressivity of the tax schedule for the income range of eligible households. In the
left panel of figure 2, we show for illustrative purposes how the transfer schedule is affected
when tax credit generosity is increased by 50% (η = 0.5). In the right panel, we illustrate
the effect of increased EITC generosity on the effective average tax schedule, and the
corresponding increase in tax progressivity. In the benchmark economy (η = 0), the
implied transfer to income ratio for eligible low income households is about 30% and it
increases to around 50% when tax credit generosity is increased by 50% (η = 0.5). 17
The discussion of the results proceeds as follows. In section 4.1, we describe the effects
on aggregates, distributions, and individual decisions both across stationary equilibria as
well as accounting for transitional dynamics. Section 4.2 provides a discussion of the
welfare implications of the tax credit reforms.
4.1 Aggregate and distributional effects
We proceed with a discussion of the effects of increases in tax credit generosity on allo-
cations across stationary equilibria (ex post results) in section 4.1.1. We then complete
our analysis by documenting in section 4.1.2 the economy’s behavior on the transition
path from the initial steady state to the post-reform equilibrium after a once and for all
expansion of the tax credit policy.
15In some cases, this supplement is conditional on number of children and filing status. Current state
supplements can be found here: <click to go to IRS section on this topic>.
16Leigh (2010) quantifies the effect of increase tax credit generosity on labor supply and wages by
exploiting using the variation across states of state tax credit supplement.
17Trivially the effective average tax schedule without EITC does not allow for negative tax rates since
the income tax schedule is approximated using the Gouveia and Strauss (1994) specification.
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Figure 2: Effect of EITC expansion on transfer (left) and average tax (right) schedule.
4.1.1 Ex post results - across stationary equilibria
In the first column of table 5, we report the statistics of the calibrated economy. In the
remaining columns we show the effect of an expansion for three level of generosity (η),
and for each of which we show how the results vary for three financing scenarios (’cases’).
We first analyze the effect of an unfunded tax credit expansion (i.e. adjustments happen
via government spending), reported as ’Case 1’, before considering two financing scenarios
and their implications for the results in the next paragraph.
An expansion of tax credit generosity increases labor market participation across skill
groups, however more so for low skilled households than high skilled households. The
total effect on labor market participation is 0.85%. Since skill types are imperfectly sub-
stitutable in production, the wage response of increased tax credit generosity differs across
skill groups. The share of low skilled relative to high skilled workers in the labor force is
higher, which reinforces this effect. The wage level of low skilled labor falls by 0.42 per-
centage points (p.p.) if tax credit generosity is increased by 10%, whereas the wage level of
high skilled labor increases by 0.25 p.p., thereby increasing the skill premium. Empirical
estimates by Leigh (2010) and Rothstein (2010) support the qualitative predictions of our
model on the effect of EITC on labor force composition and equilibrium wages (see table
4 and 5 in Leigh (2010), and table 3 in Rothstein (2010)). Labor supply rises as a result
of two effects. First directly via tax credit: a lower effective tax rate raises the incentive
to supply labor. Second indirectly as households supply more labor since they save less
when tax credit policies are more generous.
Both high skilled and low skilled labor reduce their level of savings (see figure 6). As
a result households are on average poorer, more households are borrowing constrained
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Variable SS Value η =0.1 η =0.25 η =0.5
- - Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
GDP 0.69 0.45 0.46 0.48 1.03 1.08 1.18 2.20 2.33 2.57
Savings (LS) 0.99 -4.69 -4.83 -4.75 -10.71 -11.07 -11.00 -23.33 -23.89 -23.77
Savings (HS) 2.65 -0.51 -0.57 -0.90 -1.32 -1.71 -2.70 -2.27 -3.16 -5.92
Participation (LS) 0.38 1.60 1.62 1.62 3.92 4.00 4.01 8.46 8.59 8.61
Participation (HS) 0.38 0.12 0.13 0.18 0.29 0.36 0.53 0.55 0.72 1.18
Relative wealth 2.68 4.38 4.47 4.04 10.51 10.52 9.33 27.47 27.23 23.43
Fraction HH in debt 0.29 3.43 3.46 3.54 9.36 9.66 9.74 20.39 20.75 21.31
Wage (LS) 0.41 -0.42 -0.42 -0.41 -0.95 -0.95 -0.90 -2.07 -2.05 -1.90
Wage (HS) 0.74 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.57 0.57 0.54 1.26 1.24 1.15
Total Transfer (% GDP) 0.83 13.66 13.68 13.65 35.34 35.45 35.30 76.45 76.53 75.98
Note: The steady state values of the calibrated equilibrium are reported in levels. All other entries are percentage points deviations
from the steady state value of calibrated equilibrium.
Table 5: Aggregate effects of Tax Credit policies (percentage point deviations from the
calibrated steady state (SS) value).
and have negative net wealth (figure 5). Weber (2014) shows empirically that the EITC
reduces the incentive to save among EITC recipients in the US, further validating the
behavioral responses of our model. Further below, we show the fall in savings for low
skilled households is due to two effects: lower earnings and improved public insurance.
For a large part of the population the second effect dominates: Public insurance in the
form of higher tax credits crowds out private insurance.
The drop in savings is more pronounced for low skilled than high skilled households
thereby generating an increase in relative wealth. This is mainly because low skilled
households are more likely to receive the transfer and if so, they receive a higher amount.
There is also an indirect channel through the general equilibrium effect on wages: For
low skilled households, the labor earnings effect and the effect of an increased tax credit
are both negative whereas for high skilled households the labor earnings effect is positive,
since their wage level is higher as a result of increased tax credit generosity (see figure 4).
With regard to economic aggregates, increased tax credit generosity raises output since
labor supply rises and thereby also the demand for capital by domestic firms. Capital
supply can be matched via an increased foreign capital supply at a constant interest rate
r.
A permanent increase in EITC generosity raises GDP and raises labor force population,
but so far we were silent as to how these expansion are funded. In the following paragraph,
we address this issue and show that our results are robust to two financing scenarios.
Financing scenarios We distinguish between three financing scenarios, which we label
’cases’ in tables 5-6 and figures 3-5. In the first financing scenario (Case 1), the tax credit
expansion is unfunded, i.e. the increase in transfer expenditures is matched by an increase
or decrease in government consumption G. At this stage, it is important to emphasize
that the effect on government consumption is ambiguous - an expansion of the EITC can
potentially be self-financed and lead to an increase in government consumption. In fact,
welfare expenditures are likely to fall since the tax credit expansion leads to an increase
19
Variable SS Value η =0.1 η =0.25 η =0.5
- - Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
EITC take-up (LS) 0.405 0.421 0.421 0.421 0.440 0.441 0.441 0.479 0.480 0.480
EITC take-up (HS) 0.202 0.202 0.202 0.203 0.203 0.204 0.205 0.204 0.205 0.207
Transfer to AGI Ratio (LS) 0.031 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.062 0.062 0.062
Transfer to AGI Ratio (HS) 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.014 0.014 0.014
Gini Wealth 0.756 0.766 0.766 0.766 0.778 0.779 0.779 0.802 0.804 0.805
Gini Earnings 0.408 0.407 0.407 0.407 0.405 0.405 0.405 0.402 0.401 0.400
Gini Earnings Post 0.372 0.369 0.369 0.369 0.365 0.365 0.364 0.357 0.356 0.354
Note: The steady state values of the calibrated equilibrium are reported in levels. All other entries are percentage points deviations from
the steady state value of calibrated equilibrium.
Table 6: Distributive effects of Tax Credit policies (% deviations from the calibrated steady
state (SS) value).
in labor force participation and the nominal value of welfare payments ω is kept constant
across experiments.18 Tax revenues may fall or rise, depending on how the distribution of
households responds to changes in tax credit generosity.
In the benchmark equilibrium, G as a fraction of output is 5.4%.19 Without adjustment
in tax rates, G drops by 0.3 p.p for η = 0.1 and by up to 2.05 p.p for η = 0.5. Because
output increases, the fall in the ratio of G to output is magnified: GY drops to 5.17% when
η = 0.5. However, the fall in government spending is less than the increase in transfer
spending (by about 1% of GDP or a 13.6% increase from the benchmark EITC budget
when η = 0.1 ), hence the tax credit expansion is partly self financed. Welfare receipts fall
by more than any other spending category due to higher labor force participation (0.8% of
GDP or 2.8% from their previous level), while tax revenues fall by a moderate amount (by
0.05%). This reduction in receipts is entirely due to the crowding out effect on savings, as
households do not choose hours worked, only participation, and average income actually
increases.
In the second financing scenario (’Case 2’), the tax credit expansion is financed by an
overall increase in the average tax rate for the entire population which increases equally the
marginal tax rate for all households.20 In ’Case 3’ the expansion is financed by a targeted
increase in the tax rate: in this scenario the average and marginal tax rates is adjusted
only for households with an adjusted gross income above the mean (AGI > AGI). In this
scenario, increased tax progressivity at the bottom of the earnings distribution is financed
by increased progressivity at the top. Figure 3 shows how the average tax schedule changes
in both financing scenarios using a 50% increase in tax credit generosity (η = 0.5) as an
example.
We contrast the effects of increased generosity across financing scenarios (’cases’) in
the respective columns of table 5. Overall, the effects prevail independently of whether
18The nominal anchor of the tax function, i.e. average income, is kept constant across experiments as
we want people with the same nominal income across economies to pay the same nominal amount of taxes.
19As discussed in section 2, G is a residual and we abstract from government debt, contributions other
than income taxes, and government investment.
20This scenario corresponds to an increase in the value of parameter b in equation 11
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Figure 3: Change in average tax schedule τ(AGI) to finance transfer expansion
the tax generosity increase is financed or not, and of how it is financed. The magnitude of
the effects changes slightly. The labor supply responses are systematically larger for both
skill groups when the tax credit expansion is financed by an increase in level of the overall
tax schedule (Case 2) or by an increase in progressivity (Case 3). However, the savings
response is lower for low skilled and higher for high skilled household when the financing
is done through increased progressivity (Case 3) compared to Case 2. Since adjusted gross
income (i.e. labor and capital income) is taxed, the necessary increase in the tax schedule
to finance the tax credit reform crowds out savings. When progressivity is increased (Case
3), high skilled households systematically reduce their saving more than in the case of a
shift in tax schedule (Case 2). Also the low skilled households savings response is lower
when progressivity is increased compared to when progressivity is kept constant. Overall,
the crowding out effect on savings is magnified by the tax schedule response to finance the
tax credit expansion.
Effect of transfer generosity on saving and work incentives A key property of
the EITC is its effect on labor force participation. However it is unclear whether increased
labor market participation results from the higher incentives to work or from the reduced
incentive to save caused by increased tax credit generosity. We decompose the change in
participation before and after the extension noted ∆H1,0 as follows:
∆H1,0 =
∫
X
11(i, a, ǫ)dλ1(i, a, ǫ) −
∫
X
10(i, a, ǫ)dλ0(i, a, ǫ)
=
∫
X
∆1(i, a, ǫ)dλ0(i, a, ǫ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡λ0∆1
+
∫
X
11(i, a, ǫ)∆λ(i, a, ǫ)dX.︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡11∆λ
(13)
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where λ0∆1 is the increase in participation due to higher work incentives holding the
distribution constant and 11∆λ is the increase in participation solely due to a change in
the savings behavior, holding households’ participation decision constant. The resulting
figures for selected productivity realizations are documented in table 7. For low income
households in both skill groups, the work incentive effect is important and for low skilled
households it dominates the insurance effect. This group responds positively to lower
average and marginal tax rates, and in the case of low skilled households they use part
of the additional income to reduce debt or increase savings (the second effect is negative,
while the first is positive). However, for average productivity workers, the incentive effect
is dominated, as improved public insurance lowers the marginal benefit of working for the
purpose of self-insurance.
These results suggest that intertemporal effects are of second order for low income
workers who receive the highest transfer payments relative to their income, but they
become more important for households with income levels that are at least on the phase-
out range of the EITC schedule. This is not entirely surprising as the poorest households
in the distribution do not hold savings or may even be borrowing constrained. However,
the individual relevance of the two margins and their interaction is an important factor in
the evaluation of the program and has so far not been considered in the literature.
Low Skilled High Skilled
Low Prod Avg Prod Low Prod Avg Prod
η 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
0.1 0.0000 0.0000 -0.5427 0.8041 0.0029 0.0037 -0.0074 0.0240
0.25 0.4102 -0.1299 -1.2042 1.7672 0.0069 0.0085 -0.0229 0.0678
0.5 0.4363 0.0778 -2.6128 3.9023 0.0117 0.0159 -0.0529 0.1402
Table 7: Decomposition of the increase in participation for high and low skilled households.
Units are in percentage points. Effect due to 1: Higher incentives to work. 2: Lower
incentives to save - cf. equation (13).
Wage versus transfer effect What drives households’ responses to increased tax credit
generosity? To answer this question, we decompose the effect from increased tax credit
generosity into a wage and a transfer effect (figure 4). We isolate the wage effect by solv-
ing the model holding the nominal tax credit payment constant and imposing the wage
and tax payment that prevails in the post-reform stationary equilibrium. To isolate the
transfer effect, we solve the model holding the wage constant at the value of the bench-
mark equilibrium and we feed the model the tax schedule of the post-reform stationary
equilibrium.
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Figure 4: Partial effects of increased tax credit generosity on aggregates by group type.
Our decomposition shows that households’ labor supply response to increased tax
credit generosity works mostly via the transfer effect, suggesting that tax credit is an
effective policy instrument to raise labor force participation. As the two lower panels
of figure 4 show, the reduction in private insurance is also driven by the transfer effect.
Yet, as highlighted above, the wage effect mitigates the crowding out of savings for the
high skilled population, but enhances it for the low skilled population. In this sense, tax
credit is an effective policy instrument to raise labor force participation, but it crowds out
private savings substantially, in particular for the low skilled population. An important
caveat is that the dominance of the transfer effect is to some extent also an endogenous
result due to the relative magnitude of changes in wages and tax credits: the change in the
wage is smaller than the increase in transfers. Our results confirm the concern on adverse
wage responses due to tax credit policies (Meyer 2010), but highlight that the direct
effect dominates on average for the poor low skilled population. However, it is important
to distinguish between the targeted population and the non-targeted population, as will
become clear in our welfare analysis (section 4.2).
Figures 5 and 6 shed light on the crowding out effect on private insurance. Figure 5
shows that the fraction of indebted households increases for both skill groups. Aggregating
over skill types, it increases from 29% to 34.9% when EITC generosity increased by 50%
(η = 0.5). The composition of households in debt changes as well: whilst in the benchmark
economy, 60.76 % households of the indebted are low skilled, they constitute 64.9% of the
population of borrowers for η = 0.5. Figure 6 shows also that while the effect on high skilled
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Figure 6: Asset holdings across quintiles for selected expansions in generosity, by skill
type, in levels. Left: Low skilled. Right: High skilled.
households is non-zero, it is negligible for the wealthier (who do not work), it strongly
affects wealth holdings of low skilled households throughout the wealth distribution, which
contributes to between group wealth inequality and leads to almost 50% of low skilled
households being indebted.
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Figure 7: Transition path of the economy after an unanticipated permanent tax credit
reform (η = 0.1).
4.1.2 Transition
To complete our analysis of tax credit policies on economic aggregates, we solve the tran-
sition path of the economy after the implementation of an increase in tax credit generosity
by 10% (η = 0.1). The transition path of the main economic aggregates is reported in
figure 7. In the first period after the reform, labor force participation adjusts downwards
sharply. Based on the post reform level of tax credit generosity, households hold more
assets than is optimal. As a consequence households reduce their labor supply initially,
and dis-save until the economy reaches its new steady state. Such labor supply responses
following a wealth effect have been documented in the context of inheritances by Holtz-
Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen (1993). Conversely, as private assets are decumulated, labor
supply rises over the transition path to reach the level of labor force participation that is
higher than the pre-reform level.
4.2 Welfare Effects
This subsection analyzes the welfare implications of the tax credit reform. We offer several
measures of individual and aggregate changes to contrast welfare measures across station-
ary equilibria and along the transition path. For all computations, we employ utilitarian
welfare weights. It will become apparent that our results are robust to more general social
25
welfare functions.
The ex post perspective The ex post perspective on aggregate welfare consists in
comparing aggregate welfare across steady states. Denote the difference in aggregate
welfare by ∆W SSi , where
W SSi =
∫
AxExS
V (i, a, ǫ)dλSS(i, a, ǫ). (14)
The aggregation uses the distribution of households in the two stationary equilibria.
Table 8 reports percentage changes in ex post welfare by skill groups and in the aggregate.
As the tax credit system is expanded, aggregate welfare falls. This result is driven by
low skilled households’ welfare, since average welfare for high skilled households increases.
Despite an overall fall in wealth levels, welfare in this skill group increases due to two
factors: first, as documented in the partial equilibrium section, high skilled households
receive a higher wage and are thus able to increase consumption. Second, poorer high
skilled households receive higher transfers which improves their insurance against labor
productivity shocks, thereby increasing their expected life time utility. The insurance
effect is also documented in figure 6 and higher welfare is immediate at least for Case 1
by revealed preferences: As wages and tax credits increase, if households decide to change
their asset holdings, they must be better off, since their pre-reform consumption-savings
bundle is still in their budget set. Since the probability of becoming eligible for transfers
falls with wealth, the wealthier (non-worker) households are largely unaffected by the
reform and their expected welfare differences approach zero.
For low skilled household the situation is less clear cut. Ex ante, welfare gains depends
on their labour productivity and gross income (AGI) when working. In fact while low pro-
ductivity households receive relatively more transfers that can offset the negative income
effect due to lower low skilled wage, this is not necessarily the case for higher productivity
low skilled households, as figure 8 shows.
This negative effect on ex post aggregate welfare is due to a change in the distribution
of households, as we showed in figures 5 and 6. Most households actually gain from the
extension, except for the higher productivity low skilled households who receive a lower
wage and do not benefit much from higher transfers. These welfare losses do not drive
the overall fall in welfare: they are dominated by welfare gains for the majority of the
population. Total welfare falls because the fraction of borrowing constrained households
increases by 2.5 p.p. when η = 0.5; their lifetime utility is low enough compared to
unconstrained households to outweigh individual welfare gains.
The ex-ante perspective We now turn to the discussion of ex ante welfare and results
that take into account the transition to the new stationary equilibrium. Equations (15)
defines these measures. ωtransition is an aggregate of discounted expected lifetime utility
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after an unexpected increase in EITC generosity, while ωex−ante aggregates discounted
expected lifetime utility before the reform takes place.21
ωtransition =
∫
IxAxE
(
V t=1η (i, a, ǫ)
V SSη=0(a, ǫ, s)
− 1
)
dλSSη=0(i, a, ǫ)
ωex−ante =
∫
IxAxE
(
V SSη (i, a, ǫ)
V SSη=0((i, a, ǫ)
− 1
)
dλSSη=0(i, a, ǫ) (15)
We report the welfare results in table 9. The first welfare metric (see ’Transition’
header) contrasts the indirect utility in the initial steady state with the indirect utility
in the period after the reform that takes into account the transition - this measure is
conditional on the state of the household when the reform is implemented. In figure 8 and
table 8 we provide more disaggregated information and document percentage changes in
welfare by productivity, skill types and across quintiles of the income distribution.22
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Figure 8: Welfare Gains by Productivity type for η = 0.1
21Notice that since the wealth distribution is fixed at the time of the reform, both measures use the
same probability density functions.
22These results are for the unfunded expansion scenario. While results do not change qualitatively
irrespective of the financing choice for the range of credit expansions considered in the paper for ex ante
welfare, we are not providing results for the transition with funded expenditure here.
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From an ex-post perspective, all high skilled households gain from the reform: if they
work they either receive a transfer or earn a higher wage and if they do not work, they
barely reduce assets (see figure 6) since they are too wealthy to qualify for tax credits. Low
skilled households gain if they are in the lower part of the income distribution; otherwise,
the transfer income does not offset their lower wage income due to the fall in the wage
rate. In fact, table 8 shows that welfare gains are highest for very poor and households
in the second quintile. While the former are often borrowing constrained and the transfer
effectively relaxes their borrowing constraint, the latter receive the most effective boost in
public insurance.
Low Skilled High Skilled Aggregate
η Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Ex Post Welfare
0.1 -0.26 -0.27 -0.26 0.07 0.06 0.04 -0.12 -0.13 -0.14
0.25 -0.54 -0.59 -0.55 0.16 0.11 0.03 -0.25 -0.30 -0.31
0.5 -1.20 -1.28 -1.20 0.38 0.26 0.03 -0.55 -0.64 -0.69
Ex Ante Welfare
0.1 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.07
0.25 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.31 0.28 0.28 0.20 0.18 0.19
0.5 0.21 0.17 0.24 0.64 0.58 0.56 0.40 0.36 0.38
Table 8: Welfare Gains (%) for selected generosity expansions. Ex post differences in
upper part, ex ante in lower. See text for definitions.
The results conditional on the reform being implemented provide some interesting
qualitative and quantitative differences with respect to the ex ante results. Overall, the
result for welfare remains unchanged (see table 9), however, welfare gains are from this
perspective more widespread in the population.
All high skilled households gain, irrespective of their probability of receiving the trans-
fer. If they receive the transfer, they gain because they receive additional funds. If they do
not because they fail the asset test but are working, they still gain because their wage in-
creases over the medium term. In the short run, the wage falls as explained in the previous
section. This is why (a) the increase in V is higher across stationary equilibria, and (b)
it affects a much larger fraction of households. Since high skilled households experience a
negative income effect initially when the reform is implemented, a significant proportion
of their long term welfare gains is washed out, in particular for those who will most likely
never benefit from the reform.
Low skilled households also gain from higher tax credit generosity because (a) their
consumption profile becomes smoother due to increased transfer payments, and (b) as
a related effect, their precautionary demand for assets falls and overall consumption in-
creases. Contrary to high skilled wages, low skilled wages fall in the medium to long term.
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This is why also wealthier households now gain from the reform: short term boosts to
earned income and thus consumption (as assets are depleted) offset the long term fall in
wages, which is relatively less pronounced.
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Figure 9: Difference in expected lifetime utility. Up: After implementation of reform.
Down: Across stationary equilibria.
Change in Welfare (%)
Transition Ex Ante SS
Quantile Agg LS HS Agg LS HS
10 % 0.13 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.28 0.53
Quintile 1 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.21 0.15 0.51
Quintile 2 0.17 0.18 0.08 0.33 0.28 0.34
Quintile 3 0.08 0.15 0.05 0.13 0.19 0.25
Quintile 4 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.12 -0.01 0.21
Quintile 5 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.12 -0.13 0.15
Aggregate 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.18 0.10 0.29
Table 9: Welfare Changes Aggregate and by Type across quintiles. Agg = Aggregate, LS
= Low Skilled, HS = High Skilled
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5 Conclusion
This paper bridges the empirical literature on the EITC and the literature on taxation with
household heterogeneity to conduct a positive analysis of the EITC. While the research on
tax credit is dense, we know little about its effect on individuals’ savings decision, and on
its redistributive impact, in particular towards individuals that are not directly affected
by tax credit policies. We quantify the labor supply, wage and savings responses of a once
and for all EITC extension across stationary equilibria and on the transition path.
Our results show that the EITC successfully redistributes income towards the poor
working population without distorting incentives to work. However, the tax credit reduces
the incentive to save for a large part of the targeted population and increases the propensity
of poor working households to indebt themselves. Both effects of the tax credit have
non trivial distributional effects: the increase in labor supply contributes to an increase
of the skill premium, and the crowding out of savings leads to an increase in wealth
inequality. Our analysis is more nuanced and shows that the EITC might contribute to
a widening the wage gap, but that for the eligible population, these adverse wage effects
are dominated by the direct transfer effect of tax credits. As for the ineligible population
that is indirectly affected by the negative wage effects, we show that when we take into
account transitional dynamics, a large part of the wage drop is compensated by a short run
increase in wages and higher consumption in the long term due to the depletion of savings
along the transition path. Our welfare analysis shows that a majority of the population
benefits from tax credit policies, except for the high income households within the low
skilled population. Once we take into account transitional dynamics, a large extent of
these welfare losses disappear.
Looking forward, our results motivate further empirical research into the importance
of the intertemporal margin of the behavioral response to the EITC. Our analysis could be
extended and generalized in several dimensions. First, by incorporating single households,
further predictions could be made about the relative importance of intertemporal and labor
supply effects, and their macroeconomic implications. In particular the latter has not been
addressed by the studies that focus on aggregate effects. Second, allowing for more fix
cost types would, on the one hand, improve the fit of the distribution of households along
the EITC schedule and, on the other hand, it would produce a richer distribution of fix
cost-productivity pairs among EITC recipients, as is observed in the data.
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A Appendix
A.1 A time series perspective on federal transfer programs
Over the past 20 years, within the U.S. federal budget, a compositional shift towards
transfers away from investment has taken place (Oh and Reis 2012), to the point that
transfer programs are the most prominent federal fiscal policy instrument in the United
States. As of 2011, transfers amount to 43% of total government spending. To gauge the
relative importance of transfer policies, we plot in figure 10b the fiscal policy instruments
as ratios of the federal budget allocated to benefits to persons. Disaggregating the federal
government expenditure in transfers (federal benefit to persons) by program highlights the
emergence of refundable tax credits as the most important transfer program alongside with
unemployment insurance. Since 1990 the share of budget of federal benefits allocated to
refundable tax credits was multiplied by a factor of 6. The promotion of tax credit policies
was motivated by the belief that tax credit is a policy instrument that can simultaneously
increase labor force participation and raise real relative wages of the low skilled. As
suggested by Blundell (2006) this was a key rationale behind the surge of tax credit
policies.
A.2 The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
The EITC has, along side unemployment insurance, become an essential redistribution
policy in the United States. Since its introduction in 1975, it steadily expanded, and the
number of eligible recipients has increased rapidly to reach in 2008, about 25 million, at
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Figure 10: Time series perspective of US federal government transfer programs. Transfers
are defined as the sum of social benefits, subsidies and capital transfers.
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a total cost to the federal government of $51 billion (Eissa and Hoynes 2011, Hotz and
Scholz 2003).
Table 10: Eligibility criterion for the Earned Income Tax Credit program
- Earned and Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) that is positive but below a threshold, that varies
by filing status and family size as can be seen in figure 11).
- A qualifying child must be younger than 19 (24 if student or disabled).
- Claimant must be parent / grandparent / foster child.
- Child must live at least 6 months with the tax payer.
- Sum of interest, dividends, net capital gains, rents and royalties must be less than $ 3,100.
The EITC is a mean-tested transfer program, meaning households have to satisfy
specific economic criteria to be eligible (See table 10 for a full list of those criteria, and
figure 11 for a graphical representation of the tax credit schedule). The amount of tax
credit perceived is a function of the households earned income (Adjusted Gross Income),
the filing status, and number of eligible children as depicted in figure 11. With regard to
total annual earned income, the total tax credit schedule has three distinct regimes. In
the first so-called phase-in regime, the tax credit acts as a subsidy on earnings. In the
second regime, tax credit are invariant with earnings, and finally in the third regime, the
phase-out regime, tax credit are a negative function of earnings. Also the EITC pay-off is
conditional on the household’s capital income not being higher than a specified threshold,
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Figure 11: EITC schedule. Source: Department of Treasury - Internal Revenue Service -
Publication 596
23For a complete documentation of the EITC we refer the reader to Nichols and Rothstein (2015) &
Meyer (2010)
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